An interim information design approach to Albano and Lizzeri (2001)*

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Albano and Lizzeri (2001, henceforth AL) study how a monopoly information intermediary designs and prices certifications to maximize revenue when sellers have heterogeneous costs of quality provision. Sellers pay the intermediary for quality certifications, and the market offers the seller a price equal to the expected quality. They show that the intermediary can achieve maximal revenue in many ways—ranging from full disclosure to noisy disclosure, accompanied by suitable certification fee schedules.

In this note, I revisit the problem using an interim information design approach. I model certifications (i.e., tests) as Blackwell experiments and characterize the feasibility condition for *interim* posterior means to be inducible by Blackwell experiments. Thus, I consider an equivalent reduced-form problem where the intermediary designs an interim posterior mean under the feasibility condition, rather than the experiment itself. Furthermore, I limit transfers to a flat testing fee, so the test is the only channel to provide incentives.[1] I show that the intermediary can maximize revenue by committing to a noisy test.[2] I also show the interim approach applies to a more general class of problems, revenue maximization being a special case where the feasibility condition is equivalent to Bayesian plausibility. In this case, once Bayesian plausibility is substituted

*Since the first draft, I have found my model essentially equivalent to Albano and Lizzeri (2001), although from an interim information design perspective. Moreover, Saeedi and Shourideh (2020) also use the same interim approach to a similar problem and prove the characterization theorem of feasible posterior means. Therefore, I have decided to summarize my findings in this note.

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[1] Because I model the certification as a test (Blackwell experiment) rather than a disclosure after the intermediary observes the quality, an upfront flat fee is more realistic and also ex-post incentive compatible in that the intermediary has no incentive to tamper with the experiment (see Section 1.1).

[2] In AL, the fee is contingent on the agent's quality, so a wide range of test-fee structures achieve the maximal revenue, including a flat fee and noisy disclosure. Furthermore, as AL, I do not consider a test-fee structure that contains a disclosure fee, which the agent pays to disclose the test result to the market, in addition to the testing fee (see Ali et al., 2021).

into the intermediary's objective, the model essentially becomes the Laffont-Tirole cost-reimbursement model (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993, Chapter 1) with exclusion.

I focus on the *interim* posterior mean because quality is endogenously chosen by sellers who privately know their types, and the competitive market offers a price equal to the seller's quality. Thus, the interim posterior mean, which is the seller's expected gain from the certification conditional on his privately known quality, captures the seller's incentive for quality provision.

A full characterization of feasible interim posterior means (i.e., can be induced by an experiment) has already been given by Saeedi and Shourideh (2020). Moreover, Saeedi and Shourideh (2022) provide a more general theorem when investing effort stochastically increases quality.[3] Doval and Smolin (2021) also study the information design problem from an interim perspective and characterizes the set of feasible interim payoffs in general (without the monotonicity constraint).

The model can be easily adapted to other settings. In a job market example, one can consider sellers as employees with heterogeneous costs of quality provision (education), and the job market offers a wage equal to the expected quality (human capital). In contrast to Spence's signaling model, the job market values the seller's quality, so investment in education is productive. In Spence's model, the job market values employees' cost of education, so education is pure signaling.

1 The Model

1.1 Setup

A seller (he) produces quality $\theta \in [0, \theta_{\max}] \equiv \Theta \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+$ at cost $c(\theta, t)$, where t is his type drawn according to a continuous CDF F with support $T = [\underline{t}, \bar{t}] \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+$. A monopoly intermediary (she) commits to a test (Blackwell experiment) $\pi : \Theta \to \Delta(S)$ that takes the seller's quality $\theta \in \Theta$ as input and outputs a stochastic signal $s \in S$. The seller can choose whether to take the test or not. If he takes the test, the intermediary charges him a price $P \geq 0$ and sends a signal s drawn from the distribution $\pi(\theta)$ to the market. Otherwise, he gets a null signal $s = \varnothing$ at no cost. The competitive market (e.g., two buyers bidding in a first-price auction) offers a price $p(s) = \mathbf{E}[\theta|s] = \mathbf{E}_{\mu_s}[\theta]$, where μ_s is the posterior belief induced by s.

The setup is the same as AL, except that I model certification as a Blackwell experiment

[3] Rodina (2020) shows a characterization theorem when investing effort stochastically increases quality but when the market values the exogenous ability rather than endogenous quality.

and the certification fee as an upfront flat fee. By contrast, they model the certification as strategic disclosure (garbling) after the intermediary perfectly observes the quality, so that the certification fee can be a function of the quality. First, as they have shown, an upfront flat fee is without loss of generality as it can also achieve maximal revenue. Second, compared to a fee schedule contingent on the agent's quality, an upfront fee is more realistic and also ex-post incentive compatible in that the intermediary has no incentive to tamper with the certification (experiment).

For the convenience of comparison, I adopted the same notations whenever possible.[4] The equilibrium concept is sequential equilibrium as in their model. I also maintain their assumptions:

Assumption 1. For all $t \in T$ and $\theta \in \Theta$, $c_\theta > 0$, $c_t < 0$, $c_{tt} > 0$, $c_{t\theta} < 0$.

Assumption 2. There exists some $\theta \in \Theta$ such that $\theta - c(\theta, \bar{t}) > 0$.

Assumption 3. $c_{\theta\theta t} \leq 0$, $c_{\theta tt} \geq 0$.

Assumption 4. $\frac{1-F(t)}{f(t)}$ is decreasing.

Assumption 5. For all $t \in [\underline{t}, \bar{t}]$, $c(0, t) = 0$.[5]

The assumption can be weakened to:

Assumption 5'. For all $t \in [\underline{t}, \bar{t}]$, there exists $\theta^o(t) \in \Theta$ such that $c(\theta^o(t), t) = 0$.

Assumption (A5') accommodates the additive case where $c(\theta, t) = c(\theta - t) \equiv c(e)$, that is, sellers invest effort $e \geq 0$ at a cost $c(e)$ to increase $q = \theta + e$. Thus, higher types are endowed with higher quality without incurring any costs.

Denote the decision that a type-t seller takes the test by $\sigma(t) = \mathbf{1}[t \text{ takes the test}]$. We have the following lemmas:

Lemma 1. *If $\sigma(t) = 0$, then $\theta(t) = 0$, and the market offers $w_\varnothing = 0$.*

Remark 1. Under Assumption (A5'), Lemma 1 becomes: If $\sigma(t) = 0$, then $\theta(t) = \theta^o(t)$, and the market offers $w_\varnothing = \mathbf{E}[\theta^o(t) \mid \sigma(t) = 0]$.

Lemma 2. *There exists a cutoff type t_0 such that $\sigma(t) = 1$ if and only if $t \geq t_0$.*

[4] I would rather use q for quality and θ for types, whereas AL use θ for quality and t for types.

[5] Although AL do not impose this assumption explicitly, it is necessary for Lemmas 1 and 2.

1.2 Feasibility

From an interim perspective, I characterize a test π by the *interim posterior mean* $w(\theta) = \mathbf{E}_{s\sim\pi(\theta)}[p(s)]$ induced by π. Formally, say a test π *induces* $w(\theta)$ if $w(\theta) = \mathbf{E}_{s\sim\pi(\theta)}[\mathbf{E}[\tilde{\theta}|s]]$. I focus on increasing $w(\theta)$ due to incentive compatibility.

Denote the set of quality of sellers who take the test in equilibrium by $\Theta^* \equiv \{\theta^*(t) \in \Theta : \sigma^*(t) = 1, t \in T\}$. Denote the market's prior on their quality by $\mu \in \Delta\Theta^*$. In equilibrium, we have $\mu(\theta^*(t)) = \bar{F}(t)$, where $\bar{F}(t) \equiv \Pr(\tilde{t} \leq t|\sigma^*(\tilde{t}) = 1)$ is a truncated distribution of F over the types who take the test. As will be shown later, $\theta^*(t)$ and $\sigma^*(t)$ are increasing, so $\mathrm{supp}(\mu) = \Theta^* = [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$.

Definition 1. An interim posterior mean $w(\theta)$ is *feasible* if there exists a Blackwell experiment $\pi : \Theta \to \Delta S$ that induces $w(\theta)$, i.e., $w(\theta) = \mathbf{E}_{s\sim\pi(\theta)}[\mathbf{E}[\tilde{\theta}|s]]$.

Therefore, the problem can be reduced to an equivalent one where the intermediary designs a *feasible* interim posterior mean $w(\theta)$ instead of a test π. If restricted to deterministic tests (i.e., monotone partitions), any increasing feasible $w(\theta)$ is a "truthful filter" (Rayo, 2013) that satisfies $w(\theta) = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{\theta}|s(\theta') = s(\theta)]$ for all θ—i.e., a piecewise function that is either $w(\theta) = \theta$ or constant on each interval. In general, we have the following characterization theorem, which can be found in Saeedi and Shourideh (2020, Proposition 1 and Theorem 1).[6]

Theorem 1. *If $w(\theta)$ is increasing, then it is feasible if and only if θ majorizes $w(\theta)$ in the quantile space,*[7] *that is,*

(i) $\int_0^t w(\theta)\,\mathrm{d}\mu(\theta) \geq \int_0^t \theta\,\mathrm{d}\mu(\theta)$ *for all* $t \in \mathrm{supp}(\mu)$ *(SOSD),*

(ii) $\int_0^{\bar{\theta}} w(\theta)\,\mathrm{d}\mu(\theta) = \int_0^{\bar{\theta}} \theta\,\mathrm{d}\mu(\theta)$ *(Bayesian plausibility).*

Proof. Define the quantile $\sigma = \mu(\theta)$ and $\omega(s) = w(\mu^{-1}(\sigma))$. ($\Rightarrow$) Recall that when the test is π, we denote $p(s) = \mathbf{E}_{\mu_s}[\theta]$ and $w(\theta) = \mathbf{E}[p(s)|\theta]$, where μ_s is the posterior belief induced by s. Consider the fully revealing test $\bar{\pi}$, denote $\bar{p}(s) = \mathbf{E}_{\bar{\mu}_s}[\theta]$, where $\bar{\mu}_s$ is the posterior belief induced by s. Fix any $\theta \in \mathrm{supp}(\mu)$, we have, for any $\tau \in \Theta$,

$$\mathbf{E}[p(s) \mid \theta \geq \tau] \leq \mathbf{E}[\bar{p}(s) \mid \theta \geq \tau].$$

[6] See also Saeedi and Shourideh (2022, Lemma 1 and Theorem 1) for a more general characterization theorem when investing effort increases quality stochastically.

[7] Consider the quantile $\sigma = \mu(\theta)$, and define $\omega(\sigma) = w(\mu^{-1}(\sigma))$. Then, θ majorizes $w(\theta)$ in the quantile space means that $\mu^{-1}(\sigma)$ majorizes $\omega(\sigma)$ (denoted by $\mu^{-1}(\sigma) \succeq \omega(\sigma)$). Equivalently, say θ is a mean-preserving spread (MPS) of $w(\theta)$ in the quantile space, or $\omega \in \mathrm{MPS}(\mu^{-1})$.

Because

$$\mathbf{E}[p(s) \mid \theta \geq \tau] = \frac{1}{1-\mu(\tau)} \int_{\tau}^{\bar{\theta}} w(\theta) \, \mathrm{d}\mu(\theta) = \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \int_{\sigma}^{1} \omega(\tilde{\sigma}) \, \mathrm{d}\tilde{\sigma},$$
$$\mathbf{E}[\bar{p}(s) \mid \theta \geq \tau] = \frac{1}{1-\mu(\tau)} \int_{\tau}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta \, \mathrm{d}\mu(\theta) = \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \int_{\sigma}^{1} \mu^{-1}(\tilde{\sigma}) \, \mathrm{d}\tilde{\sigma},$$

and $\mathbf{E}[w(\theta)] = \mathbf{E}[\theta]$, we have $\mu^{-1} \succeq \omega$.

($\Leftarrow$) By Kleiner et al. (2021, Proposition 1), $\omega \in$ MPS(μ^{-1}) implies there exists a probability measure λ supported on the extreme points of MPS(μ^{-1}) such that

$$\omega = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{\omega} | \tilde{\omega} \sim \lambda],$$

that is, $w = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{w} | \tilde{w} \sim \ell]$ where $\ell(\theta) = \lambda(\mu(\theta))$. One can thus implement w by randomizing over monotone partitional signals that implement extreme points of MPS(μ^{-1}) (i.e., either fully revealing or pooling). □

Remark 2. This is reminiscent of the symmetric version of Border's theorem (Maskin-Riley-Matthews condition) in reduced-form mechanism design (see, e.g., Border, 1991, 2007; Maskin and Riley, 1984; Matthews, 1984; Kleiner et al., 2021). The proof is à la Kleiner et al. (2021, Theorem 3).

Indeed, Border's theorem characterizes the feasibility condition for interim allocation rules to be implementable by ex-post allocations, thus allowing us to optimize over interim allocations (i.e., reduced-form mechanisms). Analogously, Theorem 1 characterizes the feasibility condition for interim posterior means to be inducible by Blackwell experiments, thus allowing us to optimize over interim posterior means rather than experiments themselves.

In particular, when $w'(\theta) \leq 1$ on $[\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$, it is straightforward to show that feasibility is equivalent to (BP).

Corollary 1.1. *If $w'(\theta) \leq 1$, then (BP) $\Rightarrow$ (SOSD), so feasibility $\Leftrightarrow$ (BP).*

The proof follows from the fact that $w^*(\theta) - \theta$ is decreasing (i.e., $w(\theta)$ single-crosses the 45 degree line from above) if $w^{*\prime}(\theta) \leq 1$.

1.3 Illustrative Example

Assume there are only two types: $t \in \{2, 4\}$ and $\Pr(t = 4) = p_0$. The cost function is $c(\theta, t) = \theta^2/2t$. Under a fully revealing test, the interim posterior mean $w(\theta) = \theta$, and the seller's utility is $u(\theta, t) = \theta - \theta^2/2t$, so he produces $\theta^*(t) = t$, and his indirect utility $U(t) = t/2$. The intermediary can set either $P = 2$ to earn an expected revenue of $R = 2p_0$ (only high-type takes the test) or $P = 1$ to earn $R = 1$ (both types take the test). When $p_0 = 0.55$, it is optimal to set $P = 2$.



Figure 1: Including the low type can generate a higher revenue when the test is noisy

Now consider a *noisy* test that reveals θ with probability β and outputs a "pass" signal with probability $1-\beta$. Now the interim posterior mean is $w(\theta) = \beta\theta + (1-\beta)\,\mathbf{E}[\tilde{\theta}|\text{pass}]$ and $\theta^* = \arg\max w(\theta) - c(\theta, t)$. Therefore, in equilibrium, the quality $\theta^* = \beta t$, the interim posterior mean $w(\theta) = \beta\theta + 2(1+p_0)\beta(1-\beta)$, and the indirect utility $U(t) = \beta^2 t/2 + 2(1+p_0)\beta(1-\beta)$. When $p_0 = 0.55$, it is optimal to set $\beta = 0.74$ and $P = 1.14$ (both types take the test) to earn $R = 1.14 > 1$. Therefore, the intermediary can profit from a noisy test.

The intuition is as follows. On the one hand, a more precise test provides the seller a higher incentive to improve quality and therefore a higher willingness to pay for the test. On the other hand, a noisier (i.e., less precise) test redistributes the payoffs from high-type (i.e., low-cost) sellers to low-type sellers. Because the price of the test cannot exceed the payoff of the seller who takes the test,[8] the redistribution allows the seller to charge a higher price while including lower types. Consequently, a noisy test maximizes the intermediary's revenue.

[8]The highest possible price equals the payoff of the lowest type among those who take the test.

2 Optimal Test Design

The intermediary's problem, reformulated as choosing a feasible interim posterior mean $w(\theta)$ instead of a test π, is

$$\max_{P,w(\theta),\theta(t),\sigma(t)} \int_{\underline{t}}^{\bar{t}} \sigma(t)P\,\mathrm{d}F(t) \tag{1}$$

subject to

$$w(\theta) = \mathbf{E}_{s\sim\pi(\theta)}[\mathbf{E}[\tilde{\theta}|s]] \text{ is feasible,} \tag{2}$$

$$\theta(t), \sigma(t) \in \underset{\hat{\theta}\in\Theta,\, \hat{\sigma}\in\{0,1\}}{\arg\max}\ [w(\hat{\theta}) - c(\hat{\theta}, t) - P]\hat{\sigma}, \qquad \text{(IC)} \tag{3}$$

$$U(t) \equiv [w(\theta(t)) - c(\theta(t), t) - P]\sigma(t) \geq 0,\ \forall t \in [\underline{t}, \bar{t}] \qquad \text{(PC)} \tag{4}$$

By the standard argument, (IC) is equivalent to

$$U(t) = U(\underline{t}) - \int_{\underline{t}}^{t} \sigma(x)c_t(\theta(x), x)\,\mathrm{d}x, \tag{5}$$

$$\theta(t) \text{ and } \sigma(t) \text{ are increasing,} \tag{6}$$

which also implies $w(\theta)$ is increasing. By Theorem 1, feasibility is equivalent to

$$\int_{\underline{t}}^{t} w(\theta(t'))\sigma(t')\,\mathrm{d}F(t') \geq \int_{\underline{t}}^{t} \theta(t')\sigma(t')\,\mathrm{d}F(t'), \forall t \in [\underline{t}, \bar{t}] \qquad \text{(SOSD),} \tag{7}$$

$$\int_{\underline{t}}^{\bar{t}} w(\theta(t))\sigma(t)\,\mathrm{d}F(t) = \int_{\underline{t}}^{\bar{t}} \theta(t)\sigma(t)\,\mathrm{d}F(t) \qquad \text{(BP).} \tag{8}$$

Now I solve a relaxed program subject to constraints (4), (5), and (8).

Proposition 1. *There exists a threshold $t_0^* \in T$ such that $\sigma^*(t) = 1$ if and only if $t \geq t_0^*$. The revenue-maximizing $\theta^*(t)$ is given by*

$$\begin{cases} c_\theta(\theta^*(t), t) = 1 + \frac{1-F(t)}{f(t)} c_{t\theta}(\theta^*(t), t), & \textit{if } t \geq t_0^*, \\ \theta^*(t) = 0, & \textit{otherwise.}^{9} \end{cases}$$

[9] Under the relaxed Assumption (A5'), $\theta^*(t) = 0$ is replaced by $c(\theta^*(t), t) = 0$.

Proof. Using integration by parts, we solve the relaxed problem as follows.

$$\begin{aligned}\int_{\underline{t}}^{\bar{t}} \sigma(t) P \, \mathrm{d}F(t) &= \int_{\underline{t}}^{\bar{t}} [w(\theta(t)) - c(\theta(t),t)]\sigma(t) - U(t)\, \mathrm{d}F(t) \\ &= \int_{\underline{t}}^{\bar{t}} [\theta(t) - c(\theta(t),t)]\sigma(t) - U(t)\, \mathrm{d}F(t) \quad \text{(by Bayesian plausibility)} \\ &= \int_{\underline{t}}^{\bar{t}} \left([\theta(t) - c(\theta(t),t)]\sigma(t) + \int_{\underline{t}}^{t} \sigma(x) c_t(\theta(x),x)\, \mathrm{d}x \right) \mathrm{d}F(t) - U(\underline{t}) \\ &= \int_{\underline{t}}^{\bar{t}} [\theta(t) - c(\theta(t),t) + \frac{1-F(t)}{f(t)} c_t(\theta(t),t)]\sigma(t)\, \mathrm{d}F(t) - U(\underline{t})\end{aligned}$$

(IR) binds at $U(\underline{t}) = 0$. Pointwise maximization gives the optimal $\theta^*(t) = \arg\max_\theta\{\theta - c(\theta,t) + \frac{1-F(t)}{f(t)} c_t(\theta,t)\}$ and that $\sigma^*(t) = 1$ if and only if $y(t) \equiv \max_\theta\{\theta - c(\theta,t) + \frac{1-F(t)}{f(t)} c_t(\theta,t)\} \geq 0$. Because $y'(t) = ([\frac{1-F(t)}{f(t)}]' - 1)c_t(\theta^*(t),t) + \frac{1-F(t)}{f(t)} c_{tt}(\theta^*(t),t) > 0$ by Assumptions (A1) and (A4), a unique threshold $t_0^* = \{t_0 \in T : y(t) \geq 0$ if and only if $t \geq t_0\}$ exists such that $\sigma^*(t) = 1$ if and only if $t \geq t_0^*$.

Then, we need to verify that $\theta^*(t)$ is increasing. This is guaranteed by assumptions on third-order derivatives (A3) and the monotone hazard rate (A4). Moreover, $\theta^*(t)$ is strictly increasing when $t \geq t_0^*$.[10]

Finally, it remains to show that $\theta^*(t)$ can be implemented by a feasible interim posterior mean $w^*(\theta)$, which will be shown in Proposition 2. □

Remark 1. Once Bayesian plausibility ($\mathbf{E}[w(\theta(t))] = \mathbf{E}[\theta(t)]$) is substituted into the intermediary's objective, the model essentially becomes a simplified version of the Laffont-Tirole cost-reimbursement model (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993, Chapter 1) with exclusion. The connection is particularly obvious in the additive case $\theta = t + e$, where effort e incurs a cost $c(e)$. Because types and (effort) costs determine quality deterministically, this can also be viewed as a "false moral hazard" model where inefficiency arises from pure adverse selection.

Recall that μ a distribution over $\Theta^* \equiv \{\theta^*(t) \in \Theta : \sigma^*(t) = 1, t \in T\}$. By (IC) and Proposition 1, $\mu(\theta^*(t)) = \bar{F}(t) = \frac{F(t)-F(t_0)}{1-F(t_0)}$ and $\mathrm{supp}(\mu) = [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}] = [\theta^*(t_0^*), \theta^*(\bar{t})]$. Hence, the optimal price and the interim posterior mean can be expressed as an expectation over μ.

Proposition 2. *The optimal price is*

$$P^* = \mathbf{E}\left[\theta^*(t) - c(\theta^*(t),t) + \frac{1-F(t)}{f(t)} c_t(\theta^*(t),t) \mid t \geq t_0^*\right] = \mathbf{E}_{\theta\sim\mu}\left[\theta - \frac{1-\mu(\theta)}{\mu'(\theta)} c_\theta(\theta,(\theta^*)^{-1}(\theta))\right] - c(\underline{\theta}, t_0^*),$$

[10] For the additive case where $c(\theta,t) = c(\theta - t)$, $c''' \geq 0$ guarantees $\theta'(t) > 0$.

and the interim posterior mean is

$$w^*(\theta) = \begin{cases} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta} c_\theta(u, (\theta^*)^{-1}(u))\,\mathrm{d}u + \mathbf{E}_{\theta\sim\mu}\left[\theta - \frac{1-\mu(\theta)}{\mu'(\theta)} c_\theta(\theta, (\theta^*)^{-1}(\theta))\right], & \textit{if}\, \theta \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}], \\ w_\varnothing = 0, & \textit{otherwise}. \end{cases}$$

Proof. First, because $\mu(\theta^*(t)) = \bar{F}(t) = \frac{F(t)-F(t_0)}{1-F(t_0)}$ and $\theta^{*\prime}(t) > 0$,

$$\begin{aligned} P^* = \frac{\int_{t_0^*}^{\bar{t}} P^*\,\mathrm{d}F(t)}{1-F(t_0^*)} &= \int_{t_0^*}^{\bar{t}} [\theta^*(t) - c(\theta^*(t), t) + \frac{1-F(t)}{f(t)} c_t(\theta^*(t), t)]\,\mathrm{d}\bar{F}(t) \\ &= \int_{t_0^*}^{\bar{t}} [\theta^*(t) - c(\theta^*(t), t) - \frac{1-F(t)}{f(t)} c_\theta(\theta^*(t), t)\theta^{*\prime}(t)]\,\mathrm{d}\bar{F}(t) - c(\underline{\theta}, t_0^*) \\ &= \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} [\theta - c(\theta, \theta^{*-1}(\theta)) - \frac{1-\mu(\theta)}{\mu'(\theta)} c_\theta(\theta, (\theta^*)^{-1}(\theta))]\,\mathrm{d}\mu(\theta) - c(\underline{\theta}, t_0^*), \end{aligned}$$

where the second line follows from

$$c(\theta^*(t), t) - c(\underline{\theta}, t_0^*) = \int_{t_0^*}^{t} c_\theta(\theta^*(\tilde{t}), \tilde{t})\theta^{*\prime}(\tilde{t})\,\mathrm{d}\tilde{t} + \int_{t_0^*}^{t} c_t(\theta^*(\tilde{t}), \tilde{t})\,\mathrm{d}\tilde{t}. \tag{9}$$

Then, $w^{*\prime}(\theta) = c_\theta(\theta^*(t), t) = 1 + \frac{1-F(t)}{f(t)} c_{t\theta}(\theta^*(t), t)$ and $w(\underline{\theta}) - c(\underline{\theta}, t_0^*) = P^*$ imply

$$w^*(\theta) = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta} c_\theta(u, (\theta^*)^{-1}(u))\,\mathrm{d}u + \mathbf{E}_{\theta\sim\mu}\left[\theta - \frac{1-\mu(\theta)}{\mu'(\theta)} c_\theta(\theta, (\theta^*)^{-1}(\theta))\right].$$

Finally, because $w^{*\prime}(\theta) = 1 + \frac{1-F(t)}{f(t)} c_{t\theta}(\theta^*(t), t) < 1$, its feasibility follows from Corollary 1.1. □

Alternatively, one can prove feasibility by constructing the optimal test π^* à la Albano and Lizzeri (2001, Proposition 5) that induces $w^*(\theta)$. The optimal test has a minimum standard and mixes between full revelation and an (almost) uninformative signal.

Proposition 3. *Define $\hat{\theta}$ as the (unique) fixed point of $w^*(\theta)$, and $\beta(\theta) = \frac{\theta - w^*(\theta)}{\theta - \hat{\theta}}$ for $\theta \neq \hat{\theta}$ and $\beta(\hat{\theta}) = 0$. The optimal test (π^*, S) is given by $S = [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}] \cup \{$pass, fail$\}$ and*

$$\pi^*(\theta) = \begin{cases} \theta & \textit{w.p. } 1 - \beta(\theta) \\ \textit{pass} & \textit{w.p. } \beta(\theta) \end{cases}, \quad \forall \theta \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}],$$

$$\pi^*(\theta) = \textit{fail w.p. } 1, \quad \forall \theta \notin [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}].$$



(a) $w^*(\theta)$ (b) $w^*(\theta^*(t))$ and $\theta^*(t)$

Figure 2: Interim posterior mean and quality when $c(\theta, t) = \theta^2/2t$ and $t \sim$ Unif$[1, 5]$

Proof. Because $w^{*\prime}(\theta) = c_\theta(\theta^*(t), t) \in (0, 1)$, $w^*(\theta)$ has a unique fixed point $\hat{\theta}$ such that $w(\theta) \geq \theta$ if and only if $\theta \geq \hat{\theta}$. Therefore, $\beta(\theta) \equiv \frac{\theta - w^*(\theta)}{\theta - \hat{\theta}} \in [0, 1]$. Finally, (BP) implies $\mathbf{E}[\theta|\text{pass}] = \hat{\theta}$ and therefore $w^*(\theta) = \beta(\theta)\hat{\theta} + (1 - \beta(\theta))\theta = \mathbf{E}_{s \sim \pi^*(\theta)}[\mathbf{E}[\tilde{\theta}|s]]$. $\square$

Remark 2. The construction of π^* is only possible because $w^{*\prime}(\theta) = c_\theta(\theta^*(t), t) \leq 1$. Otherwise, if the solution to the relaxed problem is such that $c_\theta(\theta^*(t), t) > 1$, such construction is impossible, and the interim posterior mean $w^*(\theta)$ we need to implement $\theta^*(t)$ may not be feasible.

3 Discussion

I revisit AL's revenue maximization problem using an information design approach and working with interim posterior mean. It turns out that in this particular case, the problem reduces to a classic mechanism design problem because Bayesian plausibility is sufficient for feasibility. In other words, the solution to the relaxed problem (subject to Bayesian plausibility) happens to be feasible—there exists an experiment that induces the posterior mean. This is true because the optimal policy involves underinvestment in quality compared to the seller's first-best (under a fully revealing test), i.e., $w^{*\prime}(\theta) = c_\theta(\theta^*(t), t) \leq 1$.

With general objective functions, the solution to the relaxed problem is not necessarily feasible, so we need to add the condition (SOSD) in Theorem 1 to the constraints to solve the problem. For example, if the certifier is a regulator who maximizes a weighted sum of the certification fee (corresponding to firms' profits) and the average quality in the market (Bizzotto and Harstad, 2023), that is, $\mathbf{E}[(\lambda P + (1-\lambda)\theta) \cdot \mathbf{1}[\theta \text{ takes the test}]] = \int_{t_0}^{\bar{t}} \theta - \lambda c(\theta, t) + \lambda \frac{1-F(t)}{f(t)} c_t(\theta, t) \, \mathrm{d}F(t)$, where $\lambda \in (0, 1]$. Solving the relaxed problem yields $c_\theta(\theta, t) = \frac{1}{\lambda} + \frac{1-F(t)}{f(t)} c_{\theta t}(\theta(t), t)$. When $\lambda < 1$, the optimal policy $\theta^*(t)$ entails $c_\theta(\theta^*(t), t) > 1$, so the interim posterior mean $w^*(\theta)$ that implements the policy may be infeasible. A similar example is an information intermediary (teacher) maximizing agents' (students') average quality (human capital) without internalizing their cost of quality provision, while the market values the agents' quality (cf. Zubrickas, 2015).

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